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Reputation and Imperfectly Observable Commitment: The Chain Store Paradox Revisited
Authors:Brigitte Adolph  Elmar Wolfstetter
Abstract:This paper reconsiders Selten's famous lsquochain store paradoxrsquo and its solution by Kreps and Wilson, which is based on entrants' uncertainty concerning the incumbent monopolist's predisposition to fight entry. Following Milgrom and Roberts, we interpret the predisposition to fight entry as the result of a rationally chosen commitment. However, commitment is imperfectly observable. Other assumptions are maintained. We show that a rational monopolist never fights entry, even if he may commit himself to an aggressive course of action. Entry occurs in all markets and is never fought. Hence, Selten's chain store paradox comes back in full force.
Keywords:entry deterrence  game theory  industrial organization  reputation
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