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基于委托代理的企业经理人激励
引用本文:周霞, 陈金广,. 基于委托代理的企业经理人激励[J]. 华东经济管理, 2008, 22(4): 104-106
作者姓名:周霞   陈金广  
作者单位:华南理工大学,工商管理学院,中国,广州,510640
摘    要:企业经营过程中,企业所有者对企业经理人进行有效激励是非常重要的.企业所有者雇佣职业经理人管理企业,便产生了企业所有者与经理人的委托--代理关系.文章由委托--代理理论视角对企业经理人激励问题进行探讨.文章引入企业经理人工作环境水平、经理人的努力程度、固定产出等变量,建立委托一代理模型,对经理人的激励问题进行定量分析.

关 键 词:激励  委托代理  经理人  模型
文章编号:1007-5097(2008)04-0104-03

The Incentive of Professional Managers Based on the Principal-Agent Theory
ZHOU Xia; CHEN Jin-guang. The Incentive of Professional Managers Based on the Principal-Agent Theory[J]. East China Economic Management, 2008, 22(4): 104-106
Authors:ZHOU Xia   CHEN Jin-guang
Affiliation:School of Business Administration; South China University of Technology; Guangzhou 510641; China
Abstract:In the process of enterprises business,it is very important for the owners of the enterprises to encourage managers effectively.The owners of the enterprises employ the professional managers to manage the enterprises,then,the principal-agent relations are formed.In this paper,the professional managers incentive will be discussed from the principal-agent perspective.A principal-agent model based on the variables,such as the working environments of the professional managers,effort and the fixed output,was bu...
Keywords:incentive   principal-agent   professional managers   model  
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