加强失信人监管与缓解民营企业过度负债

2015年已有研究文献得出了民营企业更过度负债的结论,出人意料,也引起了人们对民营企业过度负债问题的重视。选取中国A股上市公司2009-2016年所披露的财务数据为研究样本,研究党的十八大以后政府持续加强失信人监管对缓解民营企业过度负债的有效性,并进一步分析企业代理成本和外部市场化水平对加强失信人监管力度与缓解民营企业过度负债关系的调节作用。研究发现,党的十八大以来加强失信人监管后有效缓解了民营企业过度负债水平,且监管力度与民营企业过度负债缓解显著正相关,民营企业过度负债程度转变为低于国有企业;民营企业的代理成本越高,上述关系的有效性越弱;市场化水平越高,上述政策执行越到位。

Strengthen Supervision of Untrustworthy Individuals and Alleviate Excessive Liabilities of Private Enterprises

In 2015,the conclusion that the private enterprises have been over-indebted in the research literature is surprising,and it has also caused people to pay attention to the problem of excessive debt of private enterprises. Selecting the financial experience data disclosed by the A-share-listed companies in China from 2009 to 2016 as research samples,studying the government's continuous strengthening of the supervision of the defaulters after the 18th National Congress of the People's Republic of China, to alleviate the excessive debt of the private enterprises. The effectiveness of the analysis and further analysis of the agency costs and the level of external marketization strengthen the regulatory role of trustee supervision and ease the excessive debt relationship of private enterprises. The study finds that since the 18th National Congress of the Chinese CommunistParty strengthened supervision of fiduciaries,it has effectively relieved the excessive debt level of private enterprises,and the supervision has been significantly positively related to the over-liberation of private enterprises. The over-indebtedness of private enterprises has been transformed into lower than that of state-owned enterprises;The higher the agency cost,the weaker the effectiveness of the above-mentioned relationship;the higher the marketization level,the higher the implementation of the aforementioned policies;and the lower the level of marketization,the more effective the above policies will be.