The Profit-Structure Relationship in Legally Protected Banking Markets Using Efficiency Measures |
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| Authors: | Frame W Scott Kamerschen David R |
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| Institution: | 1. Office of Financial Institutions Policy, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Washington, D.C, 20220, U.S.A
2. Department of Economics, University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia, 30602-6254, U.S.A
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| Abstract: | Our various tests suggest that our sample banks that are shielded from competition by severe intrastate branching restrictions have market power. This analysis has allowed us to test rigorously the adverse effects of legal and possibly market barriers to entry. We reject the notion that profits are a result of superior $x$-efficiency. We conclude if these results are corroborated by further research (e.g., using other measures of profit, efficiency, capital, etc), and if these and/or other barriers remain, the Federal Reserve should be concerned with the competitive impacts of rural, in-market bank mergers. |
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