More effective than we thought: Central bank independence and inflation in developing countries |
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Affiliation: | 1. Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm, Sweden;2. Department of Institutional Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Economics in Prague, Czech Republic;3. HUI Research, Stockholm, Sweden;4. Department of Economics, Dalarna University, Borlänge, Sweden;5. Umeå School of Business and Economics, Umeå University, Umeå, Sweden |
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Abstract: | This study examines the effect of legal central bank independence on inflation in developing countries. In spite of the policy consensus suggesting that central bank independence is an effective tool to control inflation, the evidence is still limited, particularly for developing countries. Using a novel dataset, we analyze the effect of central bank independence on inflation for a sample of 118 developing countries between 1980 and 2013. We find that higher central bank independence is associated with lower inflation rates. This effect on inflation is stronger the more democratic a country is, but it is also present in non-democratic countries. Our results are robust to different specifications and methodologies. Furthermore, we find that all dimensions included in the measurement of central bank independence (objectives, personnel, policy, and financial independence) contribute to curb inflation. Our results shed light on which types of reforms may be more effective at fighting inflation in developing countries. |
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Keywords: | Central bank independence Inflation Measurement Democracy Developing countries E31 E52 E58 |
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