Decentralized advice |
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| Institution: | 1. Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, 60208, USA;2. Department of Economics and Business Administration, Ariel University, Ariel, 40700, Israel;1. Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology Dharwad, Karnataka, 580011, India;2. Department of Economic Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh, 208016, India;1. Economics Department, University of Genoa, Italy;2. Bangor Business School, Bangor, United Kingdom;3. Political Science Department, University of Genoa, Italy;1. Etla Economic Research, Finland;2. Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment, Finland;3. University of Helsinki, Finland |
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| Abstract: | We compare the amount of information credibly transmitted by cheap talk when information is centralized to one sender and when it is decentralized, with each of several senders holding a distinct but interdependent piece. Under centralization, full information transmission is typically impossible. Under decentralization, however, the number of receivers is decisive: decentralized communication with one receiver is completely uninformative, but decentralized communication with multiple receivers can be fully informative. We analyze the extent of such fully-informative communication, and apply our results to the issue of transparency in advisory committees. |
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| Keywords: | Transparency Cheap talk Advice |
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