Intergovernmental transfers and political competition measured by pivotal probability - Evidence from Hungary |
| |
| Institution: | 1. Etla Economic Research, Finland;2. Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment, Finland;3. University of Helsinki, Finland;1. Department of Economics, Graduate Institute of Geneva (IHEID), Maison de la Paix, Ch. Eugene-Rigot 2, CH-1211, Geneva, Switzerland;2. Department of Economics, Utrecht University and Wageningen University, P.O.Box 8130, 6700, EW, Wageningen, the Netherlands;1. Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, Marstallplatz 1, D-80539, Munich, Germany;2. University of Munich, Germany;3. CESifo, Germany;4. Sydney University Law School, Australia;1. Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, 60208, USA;2. Department of Economics and Business Administration, Ariel University, Ariel, 40700, Israel |
| |
| Abstract: | I estimate the effects of political competition on the allocation of intergovernmental transfers to Hungarian municipalities between 1998 and 2006. The intergovernmental transfers were intended to finance schooling, elder care, and administrative needs in municipalities. Rather than use closeness of the dominant blocks' vote share, which is the standard measure of political competition, I instead employ (Myerson, 2000)'s pivotal probabilities, calculated at the municipality level. As a result, the number of voters, in addition to the vote difference, is taken into account when describing political competition at the municipal level. I argue that under mixed-member proportional systems, as well as under proportional systems in general, pivotal probability reflects the political reality better than closeness can. I find evidence that swing municipalities in villages are targeted and, ceteris paribus, that poorer regions receive larger transfer amounts than other areas. |
| |
| Keywords: | Probabilistic voting Grants Intergovernmental relations Political economy Hungary H72 H77 D78 |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
