Legal pluralism in post-conflict Sierra Leone |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Economics, Graduate Institute of Geneva (IHEID), Maison de la Paix, Ch. Eugene-Rigot 2, CH-1211, Geneva, Switzerland;2. Department of Economics, Utrecht University and Wageningen University, P.O.Box 8130, 6700, EW, Wageningen, the Netherlands;1. Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, Marstallplatz 1, D-80539, Munich, Germany;2. University of Munich, Germany;3. CESifo, Germany;4. Sydney University Law School, Australia;1. Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, 60208, USA;2. Department of Economics and Business Administration, Ariel University, Ariel, 40700, Israel;1. De Nederlandsche Bank, the Netherlands;2. Groningen University, the Netherlands |
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| Abstract: | We examine the interaction between two legal systems in post-conflict Sierra Leone. To do that, we measure the impact of competition between state and non-state legal authorities on the number of disputes and on the amount of fines charged per dispute. Our results suggest a potential negative externality between regimes for civil disputes that is, an increase in the cost of apprehending a person and a reduction in the amount of fines per dispute collected when two regimes operate in the same village. This indicates that a potential benefit to the local people from multiple competing regimes is a reduction on expected authoritative expropriation. |
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| Keywords: | Legal dualism Enforcement externalities Civil war Africa O17 H11 P48 K42 |
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