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The institutions of international treaty organizations as evidence for social contract theory |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology Dharwad, Karnataka, 580011, India;2. Department of Economic Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh, 208016, India;1. Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, Germany;2. German Development Institute, Germany;1. Development Economics (DEC), The World Bank, 1818 H St. NW, Washington, DC, 20433, USA;2. Macroeconomics and Fiscal Management (MFM), The World Bank, 1818 H St. NW, Washington, DC, 20433, USA |
| Abstract: | Treaty organizations are formed via voluntary contracts among national governments that address policy issues of mutual concern. As such, treaty organizations provide evidence about the kinds of institutions that might be adopted via social contract. This paper develops a theory of the design of treaty organizations and examines the domains of authority and decision-making procedures of 22 treaty organizations to determine if any general traits are in evidence. It turns out that most treaty organizations rely upon unanimity or supermajorities for their major decisions and usually have quite narrow (bounded) policy domains. |
| Keywords: | Social contracts Treaty organizations Treaties Trust Unanimity Bounded policy domains H1 H7 F5 |
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