政府参与下制造企业物流服务创新演化博弈分析 |
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引用本文: | 许嘉宁. 政府参与下制造企业物流服务创新演化博弈分析[J]. 科技和产业, 2024, 24(14): 50-56 |
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作者姓名: | 许嘉宁 |
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作者单位: | 浙江万里学院,浙江 宁波 315100 |
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摘 要: | 在经济快速发展的今天,人们对于物流的要求越来越高。通过构建政府与生产企业的演化博弈模型,研究二者协同进化的均衡机制,并通过 Matlab进行模拟验证。结果显示,在中国,制造业企业开展物流服务创新的主要原因在于其所获得的收入与费用,进而通过对企业的政策鼓励,可以有效地推动其开展物流服务创新。在此基础上,针对中国制造企业的发展现状,提出了强化政府激励和推动物流服务发展的对策。
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关 键 词: | 制造企业;物流服务创新;政府激励;演化博弈 |
Game of logistics service innovation and evolution of manufacturing enterprises with government participation |
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Abstract: | In today''s rapid economic development, people''s demand for logistics is getting higher and higher. Through constructing the evolutionary game model of government and manufacturing enterprise, the equilibrium mechanism of co-evolution was studied and verified by Matlab. The result shows that the main reason of logistics service innovation in manufacturing enterprises lies in their income and expenses. On this basis, the policy encouragement can effectively promote the innovation. In view of the current situation of our country''s manufacturing enterprises, some countermeasures are put forward to strengthen the government incentive and promote the development of logistics services. |
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Keywords: | manufacturing enterprises;innovation in logistics services;evolutionary game;government incentives |
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