| 转型期国企经营者的身份博弈与经济后果 |
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| 引用本文： | 黄再胜.转型期国企经营者的身份博弈与经济后果[J].当代经济科学,2011(6):103-108,126. |
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| 作者姓名： | 黄再胜 |
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| 作者单位： | 南京政治学院上海分院,上海,200433 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社会科学基金青年项目《政府规制视角下国企高管薪酬管理制度改革研究》(编号:2010CGL056)的阶段性成果 |
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| 摘 要： | 转型期国企经营者选择的“政府化”，导致国企经理身份定位模糊。国企经理“亦官亦商”引发利益相关者针对国企经营者身份的多方博弈。国企经营者的身份博弈造成国企高管激励制度扭曲，加剧国企公司治理的“内部人控制”，最终削弱改制后国企的自生能力。结合国有企业经营性质差异，加快推进国企经营者选择机制的二元化改革，实行国企经营者的分类管理，是当下实现国企高管身份明晰化的可行路径。
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| 关 键 词： | 国企经营者 身份博弈 经济后果 分类管理 |
The Identity Game of SOEs Managers and Its Economic Consequences during the Period of Economic Transition |
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| HUANG Zai-sheng.The Identity Game of SOEs Managers and Its Economic Consequences during the Period of Economic Transition[J].Modern Economic Science,2011(6):103-108,126. |
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| Authors: | HUANG Zai-sheng |
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| Institution: | HUANG Zai-sheng(Shanghai Branch,Nanjing Politics Institute of PLA,Shanghai 200433,China) |
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| Abstract: | In economic transition,the government interference in the selecting SOEs managers has led to identity ambiguity of SOEs managers.The fact that SOEs managers bear both characteristics of bureaucrats and entrepreneurs has given rise to the identity game of SOEs managers among SOEs stakeholders.The identity game of SOEs managers contributes to the distortion of SOEs managers incentives,aggravates the insider control,and reduces the viability of SOEs.Given the different characters of SOEs operation,to initiate ... |
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| Keywords: | SOEs Managers Identity Game Economic Consequence Classification Management |
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