A trade union model with endogenous militancy: interpreting the French case |
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| Affiliation: | 1. School of Economics, Tel-Aviv University and David Eccles School of Business, University of Utah, United States;2. School of Economics, Tel-Aviv University and Economics Dept., University College London and CFM, UK;3. London School of Economics and Political Science, UK;1. Fox School of Business, Temple University, United Statesn;2. Eberhardt School of Business, University of the Pacific, United Statesn;3. Nottingham Business School, Nottingham Trent University, United Kingdom;1. Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER), Labour Market Department, Portes des Sciences 11, Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg;2. Department of Economics and Social Sciences, Marche Polytechnic University, Ancona, Italy;3. Bank of Spain, Directorate General Economics, Statistics and Research, Madrid, Spain;4. Department of Economics, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium;5. IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany;6. GLO - Global Labor Organization, Essen, Germany |
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| Abstract: | This paper aims to provide a simple trade union model which highlights some of the distinctive institutional features of French unionism. The model focuses on the determinants of militancy and membership in a frictionless economy. It brings into the picture three types of agents and their specific behaviour: firms accept to pay a premium in order to avoid strikes, individuals participate in the union in order to maximise their expected income and union leadership seeks to maximise his/her net personal gain. By adapting militancy—broadly defined as hard stance during the annual wage bargaining—the union leader may achieve a unionisation rate consistent with his/her own objectives. It is shown that a non-Walrasian labour market equilibrium exists wherein real wages, employment, union size and militancy are jointly determined. In comparative statics, the model predicts a negative relationship between militancy and membership; recent evolutions of the main French union confederations tend to support this conclusion. |
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