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Corporate ownership and the value of a vote in an emerging market
Institution:1. Department of Industrial Management, Business Administration and Statistics, School of Industrial Engineering, Technical University of Madrid (UPM)/Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, c/ José Gutiérrez Abascal, 2, Madrid 28006, Spain;2. Department of Industrial Economics and Management, School of Industrial Engineering and Management, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, SE-100 44, Stockholm, Sweden;3. Swedish House of Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm, Sweden;1. Department of Finance in School of Economics & Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University, Fujian 361005, China;2. Department of Finance, Eller College of Management, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721, United States
Abstract:Empirical evidence suggests that the voting premium in the Korean securities market is strongly related to the structure of corporate ownership. We find that the premium attached to voting stock is positively and significantly associated with the control value of a block of shares held by minority shareholders. We also find that the premium is negatively related to both the fraction of shares that are voting shares and the market value of equity. Empirical results indicate that private benefits of control in Korea are worth about 10% of the value of equity.
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