Congestion games with load-dependent failures: Identical resources |
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Authors: | Michal Penn Maria Polukarov Moshe Tennenholtz |
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Affiliation: | aFaculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion, Haifa 32000, Israel;bSchool of Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton, SO17 1BJ, Southampton, UK;cMicrosoft Israel R&D Center, 13 Shenkar Street, Herzeliya 46725, Israel |
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Abstract: | We define a new class of games, congestion games with load-dependent failures (CGLFs). In a CGLF each player can choose a subset of a set of available resources in order to try and perform his task. We assume that the resources are identical but that players' benefits from successful completion of their tasks may differ. Each resource is associated with a cost of use and a failure probability which are load-dependent. Although CGLFs in general do not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, we prove the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in every CGLF with nondecreasing cost functions. Moreover, we present a polynomial time algorithm for computing such an equilibrium. |
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Keywords: | Congestion games Load-dependent resource failures Pure strategy Nash equilibrium Algorithms |
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