| Abstract: | The past few decades have seen dramatic advancements in the technology of copying and the diffusion of copying technology to the general public. This paper surveys some of the recent academic literature dealing with this issue. We focus on (i) the effect of varying the extent of property rights enforcement by the government, and (ii) possible responses by producers of originals to consumers' ability to produce copies. The traditional view is that as the government increases property rights enforcement, there is a decrease in the social welfare loss due to underproduction and an increase in the social welfare loss due to under-utilization. In the first half of the paper, we show how the analyses contained in a number of recent studies throw doubt on this traditional viewpoint. In particular, varying the extent of property rights enforcement has effects that the traditional analysis ignores. As a result, the social welfare losses mentioned above can move in ways not recognized previously. The conclusion is that, contrary to what is sometimes suggested, choosing an optimal level of property rights enforcement by the government should not be viewed as a simple trade-off between these two social welfare losses. In the second half of the paper, we discuss possible market responses to consumers' ability to produce copies. Among other responses, we consider the role of price discrimination and complementary products when copying is possible. |
