Competitive sustainable processes and pricing decisions in omnichannel closed-up supply chains under different channel power structures |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Operations Management, Xavier Institute of Management, XIM University, Bhubaneswar, Odisha, 751013, India;2. Department of Supply Chain & Information Management, School of Business, College of Charleston, Charleston, SC, 29424, USA;1. ESCP Business School Berlin, Heubnerweg 8-10, D-14059, Berlin, Germany;2. Consultant at the Berlin-Brandenburg Statistics Office, Statistical Methods and Policy Issues Unit, Alt-Friedrichsfelde 60, 10315, Berlin, Germany;1. Hasselt University, Faculty of Business Economics, Department Marketing & Strategy, Martelarenlaan 42, 3500, Hasselt, Belgium;2. Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Faculty of Social Sciences & Solvay Business School, Department of Business, Marketing & Consumer Behaviour, Pleinlaan 2, 1050, Brussels, Belgium;3. Fairfield University, Charles F. Dolan School of Business, Department of Marketing, 1073 North Benson Road, Fairfield, CT, 06824-5195, USA;1. Business School, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, 334 Jungong Road, Yangpu District, Shanghai, 200093, China;2. School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, 1239 Siping Road, Yangpu District, Shanghai, 200092, China;1. School of Management Engineering and E-Commerce, Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou, 310018, China;2. Marketing & Management Department, College of Business Administration, University of Texas at El Paso, El Paso, TX, 79968, USA |
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| Abstract: | In recent years, omnichannel retailing and remanufacturing issues have rapidly emerged in the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). The omnichannel is a combination of online and in-store retailing, and it affects supply chain relationships and channel power structures by changing value creation processes. It allows consumers a hybrid shopping experience where they can order products online and pick them up in the store or test in-store and buy online (TSBO). Despite this practice, no studies exist on CLSC considering omnichannel retailing under different channel power structures. We investigate the TSBO retailing strategy and its impact on CLSC profit considering price competition between manufacturer and remanufacturer under Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS), Retailer Stackelberg (RS), Vertical Nash (VN), and cooperation (CO) models game settings. In this paper, mathematical models are developed to drive the optimal solution. A two-part tariff coordination mechanism (i.e., IS model) is also used to integrate all supply chain members. The proposed models examine the environmental and social welfare benefits of adopting green innovation products and remanufacturing processes in omnichannel retailing. A numerical study is carried out to illustrate the proposed models' application. The results show that the IS model can synchronize the economic, environmental, and social aspects leading to significant increases in performance. Total supply chain profit under the CO model is the highest. The manufacturer and remanufacturer generate higher profits in the MS model, whereas the retailer makes higher profits in the RS and VN models. When a manufacturer only wants to increase profit with green processes and is not concerned about omnichannel processes, more resources must be allocated for green innovation. |
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| Keywords: | Omnichannel retailing Closed-loop supply chain Power balance And two-part tariff |
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