The monitoring role of venture capital on controllers' tunneling: Evidence from China

This paper provides evidence supporting the monitoring role of venture capital (VC) in mitigating controlling shareholders' tunneling behavior. We use the staggered introduction of bullet trains in China as shocks to travel time between VCs and portfolio companies, which increases VCs' involvement in portfolio companies' governance. Using a generalized difference-in-difference design, we find that the increased VC involvement induced by the opening of a bullet train route in a city decreases affected portfolio companies' inter-corporate loans by 0.4 percentage points (pp) and the probability of a company violating capital occupation by 6.2 pp. The effect of bullet train connectivity on VC monitoring is more pronounced for companies that are located in cities where are subjected to a larger extent of bullet train connectivity, companies that experience more problematic tunneling, and companies that have looser alternative governance mechanisms. Furthermore, we provide direct evidence supporting the effect of bullet train connectivity on VC involvement by showing that VC directors participate more in the committees and board meetings. Our paper contributes to the literature by providing a plausibly causal effect of VC monitoring on the conflict between the controlling and minority shareholders.