Designing Multi-unit Multiple Bid Auctions: An Agent-based Computational Model of Uniform, Discriminatory and Generalised Vickrey Auctions |
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Authors: | ATAKELTY HAILU SOPHIE THOYER |
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Institution: | School of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Western Australia, Perth, Western Australia, Australia; SupAgro UMR Laboratoire Montpellierain d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, Montpellier, France |
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Abstract: | Multi-unit auctions are being used by public agencies to allocate resources and to purchase services. These auctions resolve the lumpy bid problem inherent in single-bid auctions by allowing bidders to submit a supply or demand schedule. However, the choice of pricing formats for multi-unit auctions is controversial. Neither economic theory nor laboratory experiments depict a complete picture of how alternative pricing formats perform in terms of budgetary or allocative efficiency. This paper constructs an agent-based computational model to compare uniform, discriminatory and generalised Vickrey pricing formats under different degrees of competition and heterogeneity in the bidder population. |
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Keywords: | C900 D440 Q250 |
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