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中国住宅产业化的动力机制:期权博弈和行为博弈解释
引用本文:洪开荣,贾二柳.中国住宅产业化的动力机制:期权博弈和行为博弈解释[J].湖南财经高等专科学校学报,2013,29(2):59-64.
作者姓名:洪开荣  贾二柳
作者单位:中南大学商学院,湖南长沙,410083
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目"房地产征用补偿的组合性均衡评价模型及其实验研究" (项目
摘    要:从经典博弈角度,可以发现现阶段我国住宅产业化动力不足的原因主要在于相关经济主体过于关注眼前的经济利益,忽视了产业化住宅的未来经济价值与社会效益。可以构建期权博弈模型和行为博弈模型,运用政府、开发商和消费者对未来产业化住宅的高增长期权价值预期推动住宅产业化的发展。基于互动公平的思想,通过政府引导,促使开发商和消费者积极参与产业化住宅投资,住宅产业化的社会理想结果才能得以出现并共同维护。

关 键 词:住宅产业化  纳什均衡  行为博弈  期权博弈  动力机制

Dynamic Mechanism of Housing Industrialization:Explanation of Option Game and Behavior Game
HONG Kai-rong , JIA Er-liu.Dynamic Mechanism of Housing Industrialization:Explanation of Option Game and Behavior Game[J].Journal of Hunan Financial and Economic College,2013,29(2):59-64.
Authors:HONG Kai-rong  JIA Er-liu
Institution:(Business School of Central South University,Changsha Hunan 410083)
Abstract:We can find the deep reasons of housing industrialization's bottlenecks in nowerdays from the perspective of classic game theory,which is that the relevant economic bodies are too concerned about the immediate economic interests to ignore the future economic value and social benefit of housing industrialization.Furthermore,this paper establishes an option game model and behavioral game theory model to promote the development of housing industrialization,when the government,real estate developers and consumers have high growth option value expected for the housing industrialization of future.Then based on the idea of interaction and justice,we should put forward real estate developers and consumers to actively participate in housing industrialization investment through the government guidance,and the social ideal result can be understood and be maintained by working together.
Keywords:housing industrialization  Nash equilibrium  behavior game  option game  dynamic mechanism
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