Fiscal Reconstruction and Local Interest Groups in Japan

This paper investigates the politicoeconomic properties of the fiscal reconstruction process in Japan by analyzing the dynamic game among local interest groups with concessions of region-specific privileges. Free-riding behavior of local interest groups brings numerous deficits. Our empirical evidence indicates that local privileges were powerful in the 1990s, which is the main reason fiscal reconstruction did not perform very well in the 1990s. J. Japan. Int. Econ., December 2002, 16(4), pp. 492–511. Faculty of Economics, Keio University, and Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego; and Department of Economics, University of Tokyo, Hongo, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan, and Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office of Japan, 3-1-1 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-8970, Japan. © 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: H41, F13, D62.