Revision of conjectures about the opponent’s utilities in signaling games |
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| Authors: | Tim Schulteis Andres Perea Hans Peters Dries Vermeulen |
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| Institution: | (1) Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200, MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands |
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| Abstract: | In this paper we apply the concept of preference conjecture equilibrium introduced in Perea (2005) to signaling games and show its relation to sequential equilibrium. We introduce the concept of minimum revision equilibrium and show how this can be interpreted as a refinement of sequential equilibrium |
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| Keywords: | Signaling games Preference conjecture equilibrium Utility revision |
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