A Socially Efficient Water Tariff Under the English Optional Metering Scheme |
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Authors: | Tatsuki Ueda Peter G. Moffatt |
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Affiliation: | 1. National Institute for Rural Engineering, National Agriculture and Food Research Organization, 2-1-6 Kannondai, Tsukuba, Ibaraki, 305-8609, Japan 2. School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK
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Abstract: | We design a socially-efficient water tariff in the institutional context of England, where water metering is largely optional and non-metered households are levied proportional to the rateable value (RV) of their property. Within this context, it is theoretically demonstrated that: the larger the RV, the more likely the household to opt for metering; and the larger the RV, the smaller the Demand Effect of Metering (DEM; the fall in water consumption resulting from metering). These two hypotheses are confirmed with econometric analyses using datasets provided by a water company operating in East Anglia, England. The results signify an adverse-selection problem: wealthier households are more likely to opt for metering, yet they are expected to exhibit a smaller DEM once a meter is installed. In order to overcome this, we propose a two-part tariff for metered households consisting of: a variable charge levied proportional to water consumption at a uniform price; and a progressive standing charge to place a heavier burden on wealthier households. The latter component has a potentially major role in attaining social efficiency of metering, by encouraging poorer households to install meters whilst discouraging wealthier ones. The optimal two-part tariff is determined empirically. |
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