Correlated quantal responses and equilibrium selection |
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| Institution: | 1. Institute of Mathematics, Department of Economics, and Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel;2. School of Computer Science and Engineering, and Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel;1. Department of Economics and All Souls College, University of Oxford, UK;2. Department of Economics, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA, USA;1. THEMA – Université de Cergy-Pontoise, 33 boulevard du Port, 95011 Cergy-Pontoise, France;2. Department of Economics, University of Munich, Ludwigstr. 28, D-80539 Munich, Germany;1. Purdue University, United States of America;2. Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM), Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), Mexico;3. Carleton University, Canada;1. Université de Lorraine, Institut Elie Cartan de Lorraine, UMR 7502, Vandoeuvre-lès-Nancy, F-54506, France;2. CNRS, Institut Elie Cartan de Lorraine, UMR 7502, Vandoeuvre-lès-Nancy, F-54506, France;3. Inria, Villers-lès-Nancy, F-54600, France;4. Alphability, Vandoeuvre-l?-Nancy, F-54500, France;5. FSTC/CSC Research Unit/Lassy lab., Université du Luxembourg, L-1359, Luxembourg |
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| Abstract: | This paper considers incomplete information games with payoffs subject to correlated random disturbances. It explains the connection between the uniqueness of quantal response equilibria, where large noise is required, and the uniqueness of equilibria in global games, where small noise is required. |
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