Evolutionary stability of altruism and envy in Tullock contests |
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Authors: | Frederik Schmidt |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, Johannes-Gutenberg University Mainz, Jakob-Welder-Weg 4, 55128 Mainz, Germany |
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Abstract: | This paper considers Tullock contests with altruistic and envious individuals as players. Altruism (envy) is beheld as another
motivation for low (high) dissipation rates in contests. A pure population of altruists has higher payoffs than a purely envious
population, but the altruist has a lower payoff if he is confronted with an envious individual. In an evolutionary approach
in which the population share of the type with the higher material payoff rises, it can be shown that there is a possibility
of either envy or altruism becoming extinct. Furthermore, we find an advantage of envy in such a manner that very altruistic
individuals always die out, but very envious ones only do so under certain conditions.
I am grateful to Alexander Haupt, two anonymous referees, and the editor for constructive comments on this paper. |
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Keywords: | Evolutionary stability Contests Conflict theory Envy Altruism |
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