| 民营企业委托代理机制的基石:基于监督的约束激励 |
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| 引用本文： | 余斌,周煊.民营企业委托代理机制的基石:基于监督的约束激励[J].经济学家,2003(2):67-71. |
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| 作者姓名： | 余斌 周煊 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 北京大学政府管理学院,北京,100871
2. 北京大学光华管理学院,北京,100871 |
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| 摘 要： | 民营企业主和职业经理人之间的冲突源于两大问题：一是双方的目标追求不一致，二者双主信息不对称。解决这两大问题的方法，既不是呼吁职业经理人提高自身的道德水平，也不是单纯的激励机制，而是有效的监督和建立在监督基础上的激励和约束机制。
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| 关 键 词： | 民营企业 职业经理人 委托代理 |
| 文章编号： | 1003-5656(2003)02-0067-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 2003年1月17日 |
The Sole of Agent Mechanism in Private Enterprises: Constraint and Motivation Based on Supervision |
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| YU Bin,ZHOU Xuan.The Sole of Agent Mechanism in Private Enterprises: Constraint and Motivation Based on Supervision[J].Economist,2003(2):67-71. |
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| Authors: | YU Bin ZHOU Xuan |
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| Institution: | YU Bin1,ZHOU Xuan2 |
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| Abstract: | The conflict between the private enterprisal owner and professi on al manager stems from two issues: one is the bilateral target incompatibility; a nother is the bilateral information asymmetry. The way-out to the two issues l ies in neither the appealing for the improvement of the professional managers' m oral level, nor the artless motivation. The proper solution lies in efficient su pervision mechanism as well as motivation and constraint based on supervision. |
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| Keywords: | private enterprise professional manager principal-agent |
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