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双积分政策下新能源车企、传统车企、政府协同创新的演化博弈研究
引用本文:吴君民,钱佳丽. 双积分政策下新能源车企、传统车企、政府协同创新的演化博弈研究[J]. 技术经济, 2024, 43(2): 22-32
作者姓名:吴君民  钱佳丽
作者单位:江苏科技大学,江苏科技大学
基金项目:“江苏共同富裕导向的企业新股权激励机制研究”(21GLB008)、国家自然科学“能源要素价格扭曲:成因、测度及适度纠偏策略研究”(71874073)资助。
摘    要:双积分政策推动了新能源汽车市场布局的转变,而协同创新有利于车企其提升研发创新的国际核心竞争力。本文在此背景下,构建了新能源车企、传统车企和政府的三方博弈矩阵,研究新能源汽车平均收益、协同创新所获积分和NEV积分的单位售价、协同创新的额外费用、市场订单总量、抢夺市场份额、政府激励额度、监督成本和企业所得税税率等因素对三方协同创新博弈的影响。研究表明:(1)车企始终都选择协同创新,但趋向协同创新的意愿受新能源汽车平均收益、新能源汽车市场订单总量、抢夺市场份额的影响;(2)在双积分政策的背景下,政府从行业的直接引领者转向间接监督者,车企策略选择几乎不受政府激励大小的影响;(3)政府参与协同创新的意愿随着新能源汽车平均收益、车企NEV积分收益、市场订单总量和企业所得税税率的增长而变强,随着激励额度和监督成本的增长而变弱。本研究有助于双积分政策时代我国新能源汽车产业健康可持续高质量发展的精准施策。

关 键 词:双积分政策  新能源车企  传统车企  协同创新  演化博弈
收稿时间:2023-09-18
修稿时间:2024-03-12

A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Study on collaborative Innovation of New Energy Vehicle Enterprises, Traditional Vehicle Enterprises and Government Under The Dual Integration Policy
Wu Junmin and Qian Jiali. A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Study on collaborative Innovation of New Energy Vehicle Enterprises, Traditional Vehicle Enterprises and Government Under The Dual Integration Policy[J]. Technology Economics, 2024, 43(2): 22-32
Authors:Wu Junmin and Qian Jiali
Affiliation:Jiangsu University of Science and Technology,江苏科技大学
Abstract:The dual integration policy has promoted the transformation of the new energy vehicle market layout, and for automobile enterprises, collaborative innovation is conducive to enhance international core competitiveness of innovation ability. In this context, a tripartite game matrix of new energy vehicle enterprises, traditional vehicle enterprises and the government is built, and the influence of relevant parameters on that tripartite game is studied through MATLAB numerical simulation. There are three conclusions: ①Auto companies always choose collaborative innovation, but their willingness towards collaborative innovation is affected by the average income of new energy vehicles, the total number of orders in the new energy vehicle market, and the grabbing of market share. ②In the context of the dual points policy, the government has shifted from the direct leader to the indirect supervisor, and the strategy choice of auto enterprises is nearly not affected by the government incentives. ③The government''s willingness to participate in collaborative innovation becomes stronger with the growth of the average income of new energy vehicles, the NEV points income of auto enterprises, the total number of market orders and the corporate income tax rate, while it becomes weaker with the growth of incentive costs and supervision costs. The research will contribute to the precise implementation of high-quality and sustainable development of China''s new energy vehicle industry under the dual integration policy .
Keywords:The Dual Integration Policy   New Energy Vehicle Enterprises   Traditional Vehicle Enterprises   Collaborative Innovation   Evolutionary Game
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