组合政策下双寡头企业绿色创新博弈分析

为研究政府组合政策对于绿色创新能力不同的寡头企业生产策略的影响,构建演化博弈模型,在环境税税率和创新补贴额度不同的情境下,通过数值仿真模拟企业生产决策的动态选择过程。研究表明:高强度环境税制和高额的创新补贴极大地激励了两寡头企业绿色创新。环境税一定时,补贴值到一定额度,创新能力强的企业率先选择生产绿色产品,进一步提高时,创新能力弱的企业也将选择绿色生产。当环境税税率和补贴都比较低时,两类企业均选择生产普通产品,政府的宽松管控,低额补贴无法激起企业的绿色创新积极性。生产绿色产品的单位成本增额越高,或者消费者对于绿色产品的消费意愿不足时,需要政府的补贴力度越大。

Game Analysis of Green Innovation of Duopoly Enterprises under Combined Policy

In order to study the influence of government combined policy on the production strategy of duopoly enterprises with different green innovation capabilities,an evolutionary game model is constructed.Under the circumstances of different environmental tax rates and innovation subsidies,numerical simulation is used to simulate the dynamic selection process of enterprise production decisions.Research shows that the high-intensity environmental tax system and high-value innovation subsidies greatly stimulate the green innovation of the duopoly enterprises.When the environmental tax is fixed,the subsidy value will reach a certain amount,and enterprises with strong innovation ability will take the lead in selecting green products.When further improvement,enterprises with weak innovation ability will also choose green production.When the environmental tax rate and subsidies are relatively low,both types of enterprises choose to produce ordinary products.The government’s lose control and low subsidies cannot stimulate the green innovation enthusiasm of enterprises.The higher the unit cost increase for producing green products,or the greater the consumer’s willingness to consume green products,the greater the subsidy should be required by the government.