第三方监督下政企低碳减排策略演化博弈研究

为有效解决政府监管环境下企业低碳生产行为的策略选择问题,构建了第三方力量监督下企业和政府监管部门的演化博弈模型。通过建立复制动态方程,分析二者的演化稳定策略;以建筑企业为例进行实证分析,得出不同参数设定下模型的演化路径。研究发现,政府行为和企业决策之间相互影响,当政府加大对企业坚持传统生产方式时的处罚力度、增大政府监管成功时所获直接收益和额外收益、增强第三方力量监督力度时,企业更倾向于低碳生产模式。根据研究结果提出了促进提高减排效率的相关对策建议,以期形成政企共治的良好态势。

Research on Evolution Game of Low-Carbon Emission Reduction Strategy between Government and Enterprise under Third-Party Supervision

In order to effectively solve the problem of strategy selection of enterprises’low-carbon production behavior under the government supervision environment,this paper constructs an evolutionary game model between enterprises and government supervision departments under the supervision of third party forces.By establishing the replication dynamic equation,the evolution and stability strategies of the two are analyzed.Then,taking the construction enterprise as an example,the empirical analysis is carried out,and the evolution path of the model under different parameter settings is obtained.The study found that government behavior and enterprise decision-making influence each other.When the government increases the punishment for enterprises adhering to the traditional production mode,increases the direct and additional benefits obtained when the government supervises successfully,and strengthens the supervision of the third party,the enterprises prefer the low-carbon production mode.According to the results of the study,relevant countermeasures and suggestions are put forward to promote the efficiency of emission reduction,so as to form a good situation of government-enterprise co-governance.