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NEGATIVE INTRA‐GROUP EXTERNALITIES IN TWO‐SIDED MARKETS*
Authors:Paul Belleflamme  Eric Toulemonde
Institution:1. CORE and IAG‐Louvain School of Management, Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium;2. FUNDP‐University of Namur, Belgium, CORE Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium, and IZA, Germany;3. We are grateful to Rabah Amir, Jean J. Gabszewicz, Georg Kirchsteiger, Yann Ménière, Pierre Picard, Thomas Trégou?t, Xavier Wauthy, and two anonymous referees for useful remarks and suggestions on an earlier draft. We also thank seminar participants at Telecom Paris, CESIfo, Core, and FUNDP. Please address correspondence to: Paul Belleflamme, CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain, Voie du Roman Pays, 34 B‐1348 Louvain‐la‐Neuve, Belgium. Phone: +32 10 47 82 91. Fax: +32 10 47 43 01. E‐mail: .
Abstract:Two types of agents interact on a pre‐existing free platform. Agents value positively the presence of agents of the other type but may value negatively the presence of agents of their own type. We ask whether a new platform can find fees and subsidies so as to divert agents from the existing platform and make a profit. We show that this might be impossible if intra‐group negative externalities are sufficiently (but not too) strong with respect to positive inter‐group externalities.
Keywords:
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