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大股东掠夺行为与国有上市公司治理
引用本文:吴能全,何亢川,曾楚宏. 大股东掠夺行为与国有上市公司治理[J]. 当代经济管理, 2007, 29(4): 98-103
作者姓名:吴能全  何亢川  曾楚宏
作者单位:1. 中山大学,管理学院,广东,广州,510275
2. 广东外语外贸大学,国际工商管理学院,广东,广州,510006
摘    要:与伯利和米恩斯所强调的上市公司面临所有权与经营权分离不同,现代企业的股权相当集中,普遍存在着掌握公司控制权的大股东,由此产生了大股东对中小股东的掠夺行为。这一问题在国有上市公司中普遍存在且相当严重。由于它不同于传统的委托-代理问题,既有的公司治理机制无法有效解决这一问题,因此有必要对其进行完善和补充。

关 键 词:大股东  掠夺  国有上市公司  治理机制
文章编号:1673-0461(2007)04-0098-06

The Expropriation of Large Shareholders and State-owned Corporate Governance
WU Neng-quan,HE Kang-chuan,ZENG Chu-hong. The Expropriation of Large Shareholders and State-owned Corporate Governance[J]. Contemporary Economic Management, 2007, 29(4): 98-103
Authors:WU Neng-quan  HE Kang-chuan  ZENG Chu-hong
Abstract:In contrast to what Berle and Means said about the listed corporation confronted with the separation of the ownership and control rights,the modern enterprise has a concentrated equity ownership structure and the large shareholders with the control rights.So there exists the expropriation of large shareholders from other shareholders,which is common and serious in the state-owned listed corporations.Because it's different from the traditional principle-agent,the existing mechanisms of corporate governance can't resolve it effectively.Therefore,it is necessary to improve and reinforce the existing mechanisms.
Keywords:large shareholders  expropriation  state-owned corporations  mechanisms of governance
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