Fiscal Leadership and Coordination in the EMU |
| |
| Authors: | Nicola Acocella Giovanni Di Bartolomeo Patrizio Tirelli |
| |
| Affiliation: | (1) University of Rome La Sapienza, Rome, Italy;(2) University of Teramo, Teramo, Italy;(3) University of Milan Bicocca, Milan, Italy |
| |
| Abstract: | We analyze the role of fiscal-monetary policy interactions and fiscal coordination in EMU under the assumption of strategic wage setting in unionized labour markets. We find that production subsidies and real wage distortions are strategic complements. The literature on macroeconomic stabilisation policies and policy games usually neglects this point and reaches overoptimistic conclusions about the desirable effects of accommodating fiscal policies. Central bank preferences also affect the desirability of fiscal coordination in a monetary union. In fact, contrary to Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998), we find that fiscal coordination improves outcomes in the case of a conservative central banker, whereas it leads to worse outcomes with a populist one. |
| |
| Keywords: | Monetary policy Fiscal policy coordination Labour unions Monetary union |
| 本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录！ |
|
