Managerial Career Concerns and Risk Management |
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Authors: | Jouahn Nam Jun Wang† Ge Zhang‡ |
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Institution: | Jouahn Nam is from the Lubin School of Business, Pace University, New York, NY 10038, e-mail:;Jun Wang is from the Department of Economics and Finance, Baruch College, One Bernard Baruch Way, Box 10-225 New York, NY 10010,;Ge Zhang is from Long Island University, 700H School of Business, 1 University Plaza, Brooklyn, NY 11201, |
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Abstract: | We present a dynamic model of corporate risk management and managerial career concerns. We show that managers with low (high) initial reputation have high (low) career concerns about keeping their jobs and receiving all future income. These managers are more likely to speculate (hedge) early in their careers. In the later stage of their careers when managers have less career concerns, there is no speculative motive for self interested managers. On the other hand, highly reputable managers have minimal career concerns and they engage in neither hedging nor speculation early in their careers, but they may choose to hedge after poor early performance. |
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