Regulation Fair Disclosure and the Cost of Adverse Selection |
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| Authors: | BALJIT SIDHU TOM SMITH ROBERT E WHALEY RICHARD H WILLIS |
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| Institution: | 1. University of New South Wales;2. Australian National University;3. Owen Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University. Comments and suggestions by Peter Clarkson, Patricia Dechow, Neil Fargher, Doug Foster, Lynn Gallagher, Barry Oliver, and Terry Walter as well as seminar participants at the University of Queensland, the University of New South Wales Conference on Information Quality and Markets, the University of Western Australia, the AGSM Accounting and Finance Research Camp, the London Business School, the London School of Economics, the University of Sydney, the University of Tilburg, the University of Otago, and the 2004 Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand meetings are gratefully acknowledged. |
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| Abstract: | Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD), imposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission in October 2000, was designed to prohibit disclosure of material private information to selected market participants. The informational advantage such select participants gain is unclear. If multiple “insiders” receive identical information, private information is immediately incorporated in price and each insider has zero expected profit. If, on the other hand, Regulation FD has curtailed the flow of information from firms, private information becomes longer‐lived and more valuable. Hence, market makers will demand increased compensation by widening the adverse selection component of the bid‐ask spread. We identify the cost components of the bid‐ask spread for a sample of NASDAQ stocks surrounding the implementation of Regulation FD. Controlling for other factors affecting the spread, we find that adverse selection costs increase approximately 36% after Regulation FD. We interpret our finding as Regulation FD failing to achieve one of its desired objectives. |
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