超额管理费用与企业“真实”业绩:促进还是抑制

企业支付超额管理费用超额管理费用^①指超过企业正常组织与管理生产经营活动的费用（如高于正常水平的业务招待费、差旅费、通讯费等）。若企业管理费用"激增",则可能说明企业支付了高额费用寻求政治庇佑,从而影响企业业绩。寻求政治庇佑,对企业业绩会产生什么影响呢?本文利用中国A股上市公司财务数据,实证检验了超额管理费用与企业"真实"业绩之间的内在关系。研究发现,短期内超额管理费用能够促进企业"真实"业绩,但随着超额管理费用的提高,将对企业"真实"业绩产生越来越强的抑制作用,两者之间呈倒U型关系。并且,超额管理费用对企业"真实"业绩的影响在不同企业中表现出了差异性：国有股比例较高的企业其"真实"业绩对超额管理费用的敏感性敏感性（Sensitivity）是约瑟夫奈和基欧汉在《权利与相互依赖》中创造的用于分析国际政治的概念,它是指依赖效应的大小与快慢,用来描述体系中某个部分的变化会在多短的时间内导致其它部分也发生变化。在本文中用来表示超额管理费用对企业业绩的影响程度^②更强烈;市场化程度较高的企业其"真实"业绩对超额管理费用促进作用的敏感性更强烈,对超额管理费用抑制作用的敏感性较弱。文章验证了超额管理费用与企业业绩的非线性关系,企业通过支付超额管理费用不能促进业绩的实质增长,必须通过创新与改革来推动企业业绩发展。

Excess Management Cost and Actual Performance:Promote or Hinder

If enterprise pay excess administrative costs in order to seek political protection.What impact on the enterprise performance will be? Based on the financial data of Chinese A-listed companies during 2004 to 2014, the paper analyze and empirically studies the internal relation between excess management cost and actual performance. The study shows that there is an inverted U-shaped curve relationship between excess management cost and actual performance:a certain degree of excess management cost could promote actual performance, however, as the excess management cost deepening, it will have a stronger and stronger inhibitory effect on actual performance. Further study finds that the effect of excess management cost on actual performance is different among firms, that is, a more sensitive effect exists in firms which hold more state-owned shares, a more incentive effect exists in firms which are more marketlized and a more inhibitory effect exists in firms which are less marketlized. This paper verifies the excess management cost and enterprise performance is nonlinear relationship. The company pays excess management cost could not promote the actual performance and must carry out the innovation and reform to achieve performance development.