政治委托代理中的地方政府经济行为有效性分析

用经济学激励理论分析政治代理人的经济行为,可以发现官员外在激励有效性不高的原因.在委托代理关系中,激励要有效必须具备一定条件;而在政治委托代理关系中,由于满足激励有效性的条件难以具备,使得委托人对官员的业绩很难考核准确,很难实行货币奖励.官员的业绩不能准确考核,官员就会出现道德风险,官员得不到货币奖励,就会出现经济行为政治目的,两者都会增加代理成本和社会福利的损失,导致激励考核有效性缺乏和激励奖励有效性缺乏.这在我国经济中的具体表现就是地方政府经济行为非经济性严重.从中也可看出一个合格的官员自我内在激励的重要性.

The Efficacy of Local Government Economic Behavior as a Political Principal-agent Problem

By analyzing the economic behavior of political agents using the incentive theory in economics, we can find out the reasons for the inefficacy of external incentives. In principal-agent relationships, incentives have to satisfy certain conditions in order to be effective; in political principal - agent relationships, these conditions hardly prevail, making it difficult for principals to assess the performance of officials and making pecuniary reward. When performance is not accurately assessed, there is moral hazard; when officials are not rewarded financially, there are political objectives in economic behavior. Both add to agency costs and loss of social welfare, resulting in inefficacy of assessment and reward. In the Chinese economy, the problem is reflected in non-economic elements in local government economic behavior. It also points to the importance of internal incentives in a qualified official.