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隐性契约、专用性投资与资本结构
引用本文:程宏伟.隐性契约、专用性投资与资本结构[J].中国工业经济,2004,18(8):105-111.
作者姓名:程宏伟
作者单位:西南财经大学会计学院,四川,成都,610074
摘    要:隐性契约以商品所有权分割为存在前提。专用性投资是企业传递履约动机与履约能力信息的重要通道,受资产专用性与隐性负债导致较高债务融资成本的双重约束,专用性投资应主要依靠权益融资。实证研究表明,专用性投资强度与资本结构呈负相关,隐性契约对资本结构产生影响。本文研究结论为企业融资政策选择提供了新依据。

关 键 词:资本结构  专用性投资  隐性契约  企业管理  融资政策  融资成本  权益融资  债务融资
文章编号:1006-480X(2004)08-0105-07

Implicit Contracts, Specific Investment and Capital Structure
CHENG Hong-wei.Implicit Contracts, Specific Investment and Capital Structure[J].China Industrial Economy,2004,18(8):105-111.
Authors:CHENG Hong-wei
Abstract:Implicit contracts exist based on the division of goods property. Specific investments play the important role as the accesses through which corporate can signal the motivation and capability of implicit contracts enforcement. Because asset specificity and implicit liability result in higher financial costs via debt, specific investments are to be financed primarily through equity. The empirical test indicates that specific investment intensity is negatively related to capital structure and implicit contracts do influence corporate financial policy. The conclusion has great enlightenment to corporate in their choice of financial policy.
Keywords:implicit contracts  specific investment  capital structure
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