| 问责制理论研究综述 |
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| 引用本文： | 石莎莎,杨明亮. 问责制理论研究综述[J]. 财务与金融, 2013, 0(1): 74-79 |
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| 作者姓名： | 石莎莎 杨明亮 |
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| 作者单位： | 中南大学商学院 湖南长沙,410083 |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部财务研究课题(2010328)的阶段性研究成果 |
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| 摘 要： | 问责制是基于委托代理关系的制度安排,它要求代理人必须积极回应并满足委托人的基本要求。本文在委托代理理论基础上,对问责制相关文献进行了解读,从问责主客体、问责类型和问责激励效果三大层面对问责制成果进行了归纳和评价,对我国问责制理论体系的构建具有一定理论价值和实践意义。
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| 关 键 词： | 问责主体 问责客体 问责类型 问责激励效果 |
Literature Review on Accountability |
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| SHI Sha-sha , YANG Ming-liang. Literature Review on Accountability[J]. Accounting and Finance, 2013, 0(1): 74-79 |
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| Authors: | SHI Sha-sha YANG Ming-liang |
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| Affiliation: | School of Business,Central South University,Changsha 410083 |
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| Abstract: | Accountabihty system is an institutional arrangement based on principal-agency relationship, which requires agency to respond and satisfy principal＇s interest positively. This paper interprets related articles based on principal-agency theory, and then it gives summary and analysis of accountability achievements from perspectives of aceountability＇s enforcers and objects, types of accountability, incentive effects of accountability, which has certain theoretical value and practical significance for construetion of Chinese accountability theoretical system. |
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| Keywords: | Accountability Enforcers Accountability Objects Types of Accountability Accountability Incentive Effects |
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