Should collective bargaining and labor relations be less adversarial?

In this paper I argue that the poker analogy is unsuitable as a model for collective bargaining negotiations. Using the poker game analogy is imprudent, its use undermines trust and ignores the cooperative features of business, and its use fails to take into account the values of dignity and fairness which should characterize labor-management negotiations. I propose and defend a model of ideal family decision-making as a superior model to the poker game. Norman E. Bowie is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Delaware. He presently holds a post as Director of the Center for the Study of Values. He previously was Executive Secretary of the American Philosophical Association. Norman E. Bowie's most important publications are: Business Ethics, Prentice-Hall, 1982 (author); Ethics, Public Policy and Criminal Justice, Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain Publishers, 1982 (co-editor); Ethical Theory in the Last Quarter of the 20th Century, Hackett Publishing, 1983 (editor); Ethical Theory and Business, 1st ed., 1979, 2nd ed., 1983, Prentice-Hall (co-editor); The Individual and the Political Order: An Introduction to Social and Political Philosophy, Prentice-Hall, 1977 (co-author); Towards a New Theory of Distributive Justice, University of Massachusetts Press, 1971 (author). He published numerous articles in Business and Applied Ethics.