Bounded governance within extended order: The Confucian advantage of synergy under generalized constitutional rules |
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Authors: | Dengjian Jin |
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Affiliation: | (1) The Institute of Public Policy, George Mason University, 22030 Fairfax, VA |
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Abstract: | A constitutional explanation of the economic dynamism of the East Asian Confucian economies is proposed. The main hypothesis is that the synergy between the extended order of generalized rules, first introduced by Western civilization, and the bounded governance of Confucian societies has produced a comparative cultural and institutional advantage for the five tigers in East Asia. As a pure form, the extended order, represented in Western society by a system of private property rights, a system of impersonal and generalized markets and a formal-rational system of law and administration, is far more efficient than the bounded governance of Confucian societies in the East Asia, which is characterized by the particularistic human relations and familistic, clannish, and other forms of personal ties and connections. Nevertheless, once a linkage to the extended order is established—overcoming the limits of personal exchange—Confucian ethics can support the bounded governance structures of clans, networks, communities, and familistic corporations that are effective in governing those complex tasks in which property rights are difficult to divide and allocate, individual performance is difficult to measure, and complete contract is either difficult to make or hard to enforce. |
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Keywords: | D23 D83 L22 P16 O31 |
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