Unfair contests |
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| Authors: | E Feess Gerd Muehlheusser M Walzl |
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| Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, University of Aachen (RWTH), Aachen, Germany;(2) Department of Sports Science, University of Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany and IZA;(3) Department of Economics and METEOR, University of Maastricht, Maastricht, The Netherlands |
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| Abstract: | Real-world contests are often “unfair” in the sense that outperforming all rivals may not be enough to be the winner, because
some contestants are favored by the allocation rule, while others are handicapped. This paper analyzes an unfair, two-player
discriminatory contest (all-pay auction) with private values. We characterize equilibrium strategies, provide closed form
solutions, and illustrate additional strategic issues arising in such unfair contests. |
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| Keywords: | all-pay auctions contests asymmetric allocation rule rent-seeking games asymmetric information |
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