基于博弈论的债券询价交易机制设计 |
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引用本文: | 李雨桐,林凡,薛莹. 基于博弈论的债券询价交易机制设计[J]. 中国货币市场, 2020, 0(1): 48-52 |
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作者姓名: | 李雨桐 林凡 薛莹 |
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作者单位: | 光大银行金融市场部 |
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摘 要: | 我国债券市场存量规模已跃居世界第二,但流动性仍相对缺乏,重要原因是现行询价机制效率偏低。文章针对当前询价模式的问题,基于博弈论构建兼顾公平、安全与效率的债券询价交易机制。其在中性市场条件下具备可行性和有效性,对于单边市场也具有兼容性。通过改进债券询价交易机制提高成交效率,能够降低流动性溢价,更好服务实体经济,同时提高我国债券市场的国际影响力。
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关 键 词: | 我国债券市场 流动性溢价 博弈论 询价机制 安全与效率 服务实体经济 兼顾公平 债券 |
Design of Bond Inquiry Trading Mechanism Based on Game Theory |
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Abstract: | China's bond market has become the second largest in the world in terms of bonds outstanding,however,the market is still relatively illiquid due to the rather inefficient trading mechanism through negotiations.Aiming at addressing the problems in the current trading mode,the article constructs,based on the game theory,a bond inquiry trading mechanism that strikes a balance between fairness,security and efficiency.Such a trading mechanism is expected to be practicable and effective under neutral market conditions,and can be also compatible with unilateral market conditions.Improving the bond inquiry trading mechanism can enhance the trading efficiency,reduce the liquidity premium,and promote the bond market to better serve the real economy and increase international influence. |
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