The substitutes condition and the lattice structure of the set of stable allocations |
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| Institution: | 1. Washington University in St. Louis, United States;2. MIT, United States;1. CNRS (LEM, UMR 8179), France;2. Iéseg School of Management, 3 rue de la Digue, 59000 Lille, France;3. CORE (Université Catholique de Louvain), 34 voie du Roman Pays, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium;4. EM Lyon Business School, 23 avenue Guy de Collongue, 69134 Ecully Cedex, France;1. Paris School of Economics - University Paris 1, CES, 106 bd de l’Hopital, 75013, Paris, France;2. University of La Rochelle (MIA), Avenue Michel Crepeau, 47042, La Rochelle, France;3. University of Leiden, P.O. Box 9512, 2300 RA Leiden, The Netherlands;1. University of Rochester, United States;2. La Trobe University, Australia;3. University of Brasilia, Brazil;4. University of Melbourne, Australia |
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| Abstract: | In the many-to-one matching model with contracts, I show that there is no restriction on preferences weaker than substitutable preferences which guarantees that the set of stable allocations is a lattice. Thus, when contracts are not substitutes, removing agents from the economy may decrease the payoffs to existing agents on both sides of the market. |
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| Keywords: | Matching with contracts Many-to-one matching Stability Lattice |
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