Kidney exchange: Further utilization of donors via listed exchange |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Economics, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627, USA;2. Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37235, USA;3. College of Administrative Sciences and Economics, Koç University, Sarıyer, Istanbul, 34450, Turkey;1. Department of Surgery, Gangneung Asan Hospital, Gangneung, Gangwondo, Korea;2. Division of Hepatobiliary Surgery and Liver Transplantation, Department of Surgery, Asan Medical Center, University of Ulsan College of Medicine, Seoul, Korea;1. Division of Advanced Surgical Science and Technology, Graduate School of Medicine, Tohoku University, Sendai, Miyagi, Japan;2. Division of Advanced Cell Transplantation, Graduate School of Medicine, Tohoku University, Sendai, Miyagi, Japan |
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| Abstract: | There is a set of incompatible patient–donor pairs and these pairs are matched pairwise. A match between two pairs corresponds to a paired kidney donation, where pairs exchange donated kidneys, or a paired listed exchange, where the first donor donates a kidney to the deceased donor wait-list, the first patient receives the kidney of the second donor, and the second patient receives a priority on the wait-list. We characterize the set of exchanges with the maximum number of transplants from the set of pairs. This characterization generalizes the well-known Gallai–Edmonds Decomposition Theorem. |
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| Keywords: | Kidney exchange Gallai–Edmonds Decomposition |
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