The endogenous objective function of a partially privatized firm: A Nash bargaining approach |
| |
| Institution: | 1. School of Management, Kochi University of Technology, 185 Tosayamada, Kami-City, Kochi 782-8502, Japan;2. School of Economics, Chukyo University, 101-2 Yagoto-honmachi, Shouwa-ku, Nagoya, Aichi 466-8666, Japan;1. Department of Industrial Engineering and Management, Chaoyang University of Technology, Taichung 413, Taiwan;2. Department of Finance, Chaoyang University of Technology, Taichung 413, Taiwan;1. Department of Economics, Tshwane University of Technology, South Africa;2. Department of Economics, University of Pretoria, Pretoria 0002, South Africa;1. Departments of Pediatrics;2. Medicine, and Neurobiology & Anatomy, University of Utah School of Medicine, Salt Lake City, UT, USA |
| |
| Abstract: | We establish a model wherein a private firm competes with a partially privatized firm whose objective function is endogenously determined through bargaining between owners—the welfare-maximizing government and dividend-maximizing private shareholders. Many existing works on partial privatization have assumed that privatization increases the weight of profits in the partially privatized firm's objective, whereas it decreases the weight of welfare. However, our bargaining approach shows that this result can be reversed. |
| |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
