Revenue and efficiency ranking in large multi-unit and bundle auctions |
| |
| Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, NUS, 1 Arts Link, AS-2#05-36, Singapore;2. Department of Statistics and Act. Sci., University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242, USA;1. EPEE, University of Evry, University Paris-Saclay, France;2. IPAG Business School, PSE, CNRS, TIMAS, APD, France;3. Montpellier Business School – Montpellier Research in Management, France;1. ICEF, NRU Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russian Federation;2. Saïd Business School and St. Edmund Hall, University of Oxford, United Kingdom;1. Faculty of Business and Economics (HEC), University of Lausanne, Internef 538, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland;2. School of Economics, University of Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia |
| |
| Abstract: | Should a seller use a multi-unit auction for identical and indivisible units of a good? We show, under specific assumptions on the value distributions of the bidders, that in large markets the multi-unit format generates higher (lower) expected revenue compared to the bundled format when the supply is relatively scarce (abundant). In contrast, a large market is shown to be always more efficient under the multi-unit format than its bundled counterpart. Thus under these assumptions a profit maximizing seller is expected to choose the relatively efficient multi-unit format when supply is scarce. |
| |
| Keywords: | Bundling Efficiency Multi-unit auction |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
