首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

大股东控制对资产替代及资本结构的影响
引用本文:江伟.大股东控制对资产替代及资本结构的影响[J].山西财经大学学报,2007,29(9):68-73.
作者姓名:江伟
作者单位:暨南大学,会计系,广东,广州,510632
基金项目:国家自然科学基金;暨南大学校科研和教改项目
摘    要:在债权人的法律保护以及自我保护都比较弱的情况下,大股东会选择很高的负债比率进行资产替代,从而侵害债权人的利益。大股东的持股比例、公司类别以及债务期限结构都会对大股东选择很高的负债比率进行资产替代的行为产生影响。

关 键 词:大股东控制  资产替代  资本结构
文章编号:1007-9556(2007)09-0068-06
收稿时间:2007-07-19
修稿时间:2007年7月19日

Impact of Large Shareholders Control to Asset Substitution and Capital Structure
JIANG Wei.Impact of Large Shareholders Control to Asset Substitution and Capital Structure[J].Journal of Shanxi Finance and Economics University,2007,29(9):68-73.
Authors:JIANG Wei
Institution:Dept.of Accounting,Jinan University,Guangzhou 510632,China
Abstract:This paper examines the capital structure decisions taken by large shareholders in Chinese listed firms to carry out the behavior of asset substitution.The empirical results show that,under the weak creditor protection by law and self-protection,large shareholders will choose higher capital structure to take asset substitution,through which to expropriate the interests of creditors.What' more,the shares held by large shareholders,the firms' nature and debt maturity structure can all have effect on the capital structure decisions taken by large shareholders through which to take asset substitution.
Keywords:large shareholders control  asset substitution  capital structure
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号