Contracts without memory in multiperiod agency models |
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Authors: | John C Fellingham D.Paul Newman Yoon S Suh |
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Affiliation: | University of Texas, Austin, Texas 78712 USA;University of California, Los Angeles, California 90024 USA |
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Abstract: | Settings are considered in which optimal multiperiod contracts can have no memory, i.e., where second period payments do not need to depend on first period outcomes. If contracts have no memory, a repeated agency game can be played myopically; there are no gains to long-term relationships. Conditions on preferences for a no memory contract are presented. In an agency game with moral hazard on the act selection, preference separability and domain additivity imply the existence of a no memory contract. In a setting without moral hazard but with asymmetric information on the outcome, domain additivity implies no memory. |
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