A characterisation of the perfect equilibria of infinite horizon games |
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Authors: | Christopher Harris |
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Institution: | Nuffield College, Oxford OX1 1NF, England |
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Abstract: | This paper builds on the work of Fudenberg and Levine (J. Econ. Theory31 (1983), 251–268). It shows that the perfect equilibria of any game in which events become uniformly unimportant as their distance into the future increases can be characterised as limits of sequences of perfect approximate equilibrium points of finite horizon approximations to the game. The result holds both for a strong and for a weak topology. The topologies are tractable, and the nature of convergence relative to them is transparent. Finally, the weak topology is probably the weakest tractable topology in which the result holds. |
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