Dumping in a product differentiated reciprocal trade industry emitting global pollution

By modeling an international industry where developed and developing countries’ firms reciprocally trade differentiated goods under global pollution and the incomplete internalization of the pollution externality, we examine the firms’ dumping and anti-dumping duty (ADD). We assume that the product quality, pollution emissions, and consumer's pollution internalization are worse in the developing country. We find, among others, that the developing country's firm always conducts dumping, but the developed country's firm only does so under a certain condition and that if the two countries’ internalization degrees of the pollution externality are the same, the firms’ dumping disappears, regardless of product qualities and units of pollution emissions. We also show that a rise in the developed (developing) country's ADD decreases (increases) global pollution and that a rise in a country's ADD always decreases its rival country's welfare, but there is the possibility that it also reduces its own welfare in a certain case.