The International Coffee Agreement: Economics of the Nonmember Market

The provisions of the 1983 International Coffee Agreement (ICA) and proposed reforms to eliminate exports to nonmember importers at discounted prices are analyzed. The discounted sales were a key issue that led to the breakdown of negotiations for a new ICA and the end of export quotas under the current agreement. A model of the world coffee market incorporating the policy response of exporting countries is used to analyze the welfare implications of the different alternatives. The model shows that the price discounts result from the structure of the current agreement (the existence of nonmember importing countries) and allocation of export quotas for the member market, which does not reflect export capacity. Welfare calculations based on the model show that several small exporters derive substantial benefits from nonmember market sales. These exporters will not be willing to comply with an arrangement to allocate quotas for the nonmember market unless they receive a large share of this market. However, the large exporters appear determined to retain their market share. The results of the model predict that, unless importers no longer insist on eliminating the price discounts, a new agreement is unlikely.